Tool & MCP fingerprinting
Every tool the agent loaded — local CLI, MCP server, browser plugin, custom function — is hashed, attested, and matched against the public Aegis registry of known-good and known-malicious tools.
Aegis · Sentinel
In one command
It launches the agent inside a verified isolation profile, hooks its tool surface, and starts streaming attestation events to your evidence sink — your SIEM, an Aegis ledger, or a local file.
$ aegis sentinel run --profile research-strict -- claude ▸ aegis sentinel · v0.1.0 ▸ Profile: research-strict [scan] ✓ runtime fingerprinted 328ms [scan] ✓ 12 tools attested 141ms [scan] ! 1 mcp server unknown → blocked: github.com/joe/yolo-mcp@HEAD [sweep] ✓ credentials in scope 63ms [isolate] ✓ profile applied 17ms fs ⊂ ~/work · net ⊂ allowlist · syscall.deny=ptrace,setns ▸ Aegis is now supervising claude. events → evt.aegis-ledger pause → ⌃C (snapshot + quarantine)
Capabilities
Every tool the agent loaded — local CLI, MCP server, browser plugin, custom function — is hashed, attested, and matched against the public Aegis registry of known-good and known-malicious tools.
Scans the agent’s reachable credential surface — env, keychain, ~/.config, MCP secrets, browser cookies — and flags anything the agent shouldn’t see for its declared scope.
Pre-built sandboxes per task class (research, coding, ops). Filesystem, network, syscall constraints baked in. No agent-side configuration; Sentinel enforces from outside.
When Sentinel signals a compromise, the agent is paused, state snapshotted, secrets rotated. The next session starts from a known-clean checkpoint, not yesterday’s.
Between tasks, Sentinel diffs the agent’s working memory against a baseline and removes drift, transient context, and any data classified as sensitive by your policy.
Every tool call, file write, and network connection emits an attestation event. Pipe it to your SIEM. The agent doesn’t get to silently change its own behavior.
Command reference · v0.1
aegis sentinel scanFingerprint the agent runtime — installed tools, MCP servers, environment, reachable credentials.
aegis sentinel sweep --credentialsSweep the credential surface; emit a redacted manifest of what the agent could see.
aegis sentinel run --profile research-strictLaunch the agent inside an isolation profile.
aegis sentinel cleanse --memoryDelta-cleanse working memory between tasks; remove drift and PII.
aegis sentinel quarantine <session>Snapshot session state, rotate exposed secrets, mark the agent for reset.
aegis sentinel attestEmit an attestation bundle for the current runtime — replayable, signed.
Detection catalog
Catalog grows from real incidents, not press releases. Every entry has a reproducer in SecureBench.
Browse the SecureBench catalogNext move